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COMMENTS
Genetic Testing and Insurance
Classification: National Action Can
Prevent Discrimination Based on the
"Luck of the Genetic Draw"
I. Introduction
More than three thousand human disorders are closely related
to or are the result of genetic composition.' In the past decade the
ability to determine-through genetic testing-which individuals
carry genetic material which predisposes them to contracting these
disorders has grown dramatically.2 Unquestionably, genetic testing
presents significant prospects for early diagnosis and treatment of
many genetic disorders.'
In addition to the potential benefits, however, genetic testing
raises many questions." For example, should health and life insurers
be permitted to engage in genetic testing of applicants or use results
1. Begley, Katz & Drew, The Genome Initiative, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 58, 60
[hereinafter Genome Initiative].
2. McAuliff, Predicting Diseases, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. May 25, 1987, at 64, 68.
With precision undreamed of even five years ago, medical scientists are rap-
idly zeroing in on the genes that influence, and occasionally dictate, an individ-
ual's health even into old age. In just the last few years, researchers have identi-
fied patters -of genes that raise a person's susceptibility to heart attacks,
emphysema, juvenile diabetes, multiple sclerosis, and certain rare cancers.
Id. at 64.
3. Id. "If [healthy] people are alerted to the genetic liabilities they and their children
carry, they can develop healthy habits for life, or at least be treated at the earliest possible
stage." Id.
4. One question is whether family members should have the right to know the results of
such tests. See Lappe, The Limits of Genetic Inquiry, 17 HASTINGS CEN. REP. 5, 7 (Aug./
Sept. 1987). A second question is whether employers should be permitted to test employees
and job applicants and use the results in making decisions regarding hiring and firing. See,
e.g., Peirce, The Regulation of Genetic Testing in the Workplace - A Legislative Proposal,
46 OHIo ST. L.J. 771, 779 (1985); Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to
Occupational Illness, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1983).
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of genetic tests as a basis for granting or denying coverage or deter-
mining rates?5 These issues are particularly important as the denial
of health or life insurance can have grave consequences for individu-
als and families.' Insurers' use of genetic test results also presents
the problem of confidentiality, which could have negative social and
economic consequences for insurance applicants.7 Insurers that en-
gage in genetic testing also present serious ethical problems.8 In ad-
dition to these issues, one must also consider whether it is fair or just
for persons to be denied insurance coverage based on their genetic
makeup, a variable over which they have no control. Because insur-
ance is the medium by which society redistributes the risk of loss
from individuals to groups of individuals, one must consider the fair-
ness of a system of risk distribution that is based upon the results of
genetic tests. 9 Finally, genetic testing and the use of genetic test re-
sults must be considered in the group insurance context to determine
the number of persons who would be affected by genetic testing and
to explore the effects of such testing upon employment
discrimination.10
The focus of this Comment is on the extent to which health and
life insurers should be permitted to engage in genetic testing and to
use genetic test results to determine coverage and rates. To place
this issue into proper perspective, part II of this Comment examines
5. Several writers in the scientific community have raised these questions over the past
few years. Lewis, Genetic-Marker Testing: Are We Ready for It?, IV ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH.,
76, 79 (1987). See also, Kolata, Genetic Screening Raises Questions for Employers and In-
surers, 232 SCIENCE 317 (1986); Shapiro, Comings, Jones & Rimoin, New Frontiers in Ge-
netic Medicine, 104 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 527, 536 (1986) [hereinafter New Frontiers].
These questions are, to some extent, independent of one another, for insurance companies
could use genetic test results without engaging in testing. See infra notes 21-25 and accompa-
nying text.
6. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text. This Comment will focus on individ-
ual insurance coverage, as opposed to group coverage, except where otherwise indicated. Group
insurance is usually sold to an employer, who either provides or sells the cost of the coverage to
its employees. See Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One
Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 835, 849 (1986) [hereinafter Wortham, Invisible
Hand]. Eighty-five percent of health insurance policies and forty-five percent of life insurance
policies are sold through group policies in which classifications such as age and gender are
often not considered by the insurer. Id. These statistics, however, do not lessen the significance
of this Comment. First, fifteen percent of those covered by health insurance have individual -
as opposed to group - policies. Id. Second, 37 million Americans have neither public or pri-
vate health insurance. Id. at 52-53. These persons may be affected by genetic testing if they
seek health insurance in the future. Third, the use of genetic testing technology may influence
insurers to apply the technology.to even the largest groups. See infra text accompanying notes
101-107. Thus, nearly all individuals applying for group or individual insurance coverage may
be affected by genetic testing.
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current and future technologies in genetic testing. Part III considers
the reasons supporting an insurers desire to use test results and part
IV discusses the potential problems resulting from such use. Next,
Part V examines the current insurance laws that may be applicable
to an insurers' use of genetic testing. An examination of both these
laws and their underlying theories demonstrates the inability of the
present statutes to deal effectively with the challenges presented by
genetic testing. Finally, part VI sets forth recommendations for ma-
jor legislative change which would essentially ban the use of genetic
testing and genetic test results by insurers.
II. Genetic Testing
A. Current Testing Technology
In order to determine an individual's predisposition for particu-
lar diseases, the individual may undergo a genetic screening. Genetic
screening is a one-time test that requires the person to provide a
small sample of blood.11 DNA12 is extracted from the person's blood.
Two types of testing may then occur: (1) direct gene probes;" or (2)
tests for the presence of genetic markers."
11. Peirce, supra note 4, at 777.
12. McAuliffe, supra note 2, at 68. All human cells contain twenty-three pairs of identi-
cal chromosomes. Each set consists of twenty-three chromosomes donated by the individual's
parents. Along these chromosomes are arrayed approximately 100,000 genes. These genes reg-
ulate protein production by cells, which ultimately results in blue eyes, brown hair, or any
number of other human characteristics, including genetic diseases. Each gene is composed of a
uniquely-ordered sequence of DNA. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is a complex molecule
which is composed of four chemicals or bases: cytosine (C), adenine (A), guanine (G), and
thymine (T). These bases always occur in pairs (G matching with C, A matching with T) and
give the DNA its double-helix form. The specific order of the base pairs along the DNA give
each person unique genes. See id. at 68; Joyce, Genes Reach the Medical Market, NEW SCI-
ENTIST, July 16, 1987, at 45; Genome Initiative, supra note I, at 58.
13. A direct gene probe (oligonucleotide probe) is a segment of single-stranded DNA
(as opposed to the normal double-stranded or double-helix formation of human DNA) which is
made up of a particular sequence of bases. In order to utilize a probe, a technician first uses
enzymes combined with a heating process to cut the human DNA into segments and separate
the two strands of complementary base pairs. At this point she will add radioactive probes.
The probes are composed of strands of DNA which will complement only a strand of the
human DNA containing a sequence of bases known to be associated with a particular disease.
If the probe combines with a segment of human DNA, the human DNA will become radioac-
tive, indicating to the technician that the genetic defect is present. See Joyce, supra note 12, at
45; McAuliffe, supra note 2, at 69.
14. Genetic markers are used to detect genetic defects when the specific sequence of
base pairs associated with the disease is unknown. Genetic markers are segments of DNA that
are closely associated with the presence of a defective gene. Their presence can be detected by
a technician if she adds specific restriction enzymes to the human DNA. The restriction en-
zymes will cut the human DNA where the marker sequence appears. When someone with a
genetic defect has their DNA segmented by a particular restriction enzyme, an abnormal pat-
tern of segments will result. That pattern is detected by a gene probe which attaches to the
marker sequence. See Joyce, supra note 12, at 45-46.
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The use of direct gene probes is restricted because in order to
develop such probes, scientists must first know the sequence of base
pairs of the gene that causes the disease.15 Currently, direct probes
are available for only three diseases: sickle-cell anemia, alpha-anti-
trypsin deficiency, and some types of thalassemia."6
Genetic markers, conversely, are plentiful. Markers exist for
Huntington's disease, cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy,
Alzheimer's disease, polycystic kidney disease and others.1 7 Some
problems associated with genetic marker testing exist, however, and
make it less attractive than the use of direct gene probes. First, the
person being tested for a genetic defect must have additional family
members who suffer from the disorder submit to genetic testing in
order for his test to produce accurate results. 8 Second, even when
enough family members are tested, the results still can be
inaccurate.' 9
Despite these limitations on current genetic screening technol-
ogy, genetic testing still produces some results accurate enough to be
useful to health and life insurers. Direct gene probes are available
for the three mentioned diseases and can be used selectively by in-
surers when the policy application suggests a test is warranted."0 Ad-
ditionally, while insurers may not want to perform genetic marker
tests on policy applicants, they could require applicants to reveal the
results of any tests that have been performed."' Because direct
15. See id. at 45.
16. Cooper & Schmidtke, Diagnosis of Genetic Disease Using Recominant DNA, 73
HUM. GENETICS 1, 1-2 (1986). Although gene probes are available for many other diseases,
currently these probes are not useful because genetic defects manifest themselves in so many
different forms. Among these are diabetes mellitus, Type A growth hormone deficiency, hemo-
philia A and B, and Marfan syndrome. Id. at 2.
17. Merz, With Current Gene Markers, Presymptomatic Diagnosis of Heritable Disease
Is Still a Family Affair, 258 J. A.M.A. 1132 (1987).
18. Id. at 1132. Because genetic markers appear in different forms in different persons,
-geneticists must have blood samples from at least two generations of affected and unaffected
members." Id. Only after testing family members who suffer from the disorder can a geneticist
make an accurate diagnosis. Id. See also Lewis, supra note 5, at 79; New Frontiers, supra
note 5, at 535.
19. Merz, supra note 17, at 1132. The distance of the marker from the gene, differences
in family inheritance patterns, and human error can cause these inaccurate results. Id. at
1132-33.
20. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Medical Testing and Health
Insurance OTA-H-384, at 141 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1988) [herein-
after Medical Testing].
21. Genetic tests are already performed by some employers, see Peirce, supra note 4, at
776; university testing centers, see Kolata, supra note 5, at 317-19; and private testing centers,
see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. In the near future, genetic testing may become a
part of routine medical care. See Medical Testing, supra note 20, at 140. It is also possible
that population-wide screening efforts will be performed for some common genetically-related
disorders. Id. at 134. As long as the results of such tests become a part of an individual's
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probes provide information about only a few disorders, the second
option is the one insurers might want to use right away. This infor-
mation would be extremely valuable if the applicant and his family
had been tested for Huntington's disease22 or cystic fibrosis, 23 disor-
ders for which accurate genetic marker tests are already available.
This use of genetic test results by insurers would have an immediate
impact upon some applicants, 24 and will likely affect millions of
Americans as early as 1992.25
B. Testing Technology in the Near Future
Current genetic tests may be improved by two methods. One
method involves developing more accurate genetic marker tests. The
other method is to gain more knowledge about the particular genes
that cause specific diseases. With this additional knowledge, direct
genetic probes will be able to detect a genetic disorder with greater
certainty and without the need to test a person's family members
who suffer from a particular disorder.
The amount of knowledge about human genes is accumulating
rapidly.2 6 One writer has described the current pace of genetic dis-
covery as "an unprecedented explosion of knowledge in human ge-
netics."'2 7 Driven by incentives for huge profits as well as a federally-
funded project to map the entire human genome,2 8 researchers will
continue to add to this amount of knowledge at a rapid pace
throughout the coming decades.
1. The Private Sector and Developments in Genetic Test-
ing.-Private corporations have played a significant role in develop-
ing new genetic tests. Collaborative Research, in Bedford, Massa-
medical records, insurance companies can gain access to them. Kolata, supra note 5, at 319.
See also infra text accompanying note 106.
22. Genetic marker testing can determine with 96 percent accuracy whether a person
will develop Huntington's disease. Lewis, supra note 5, at 76, 78.
23. Genetic marker testing can determine with accuracy of between 80 and 99 percent
(depending on the number of markers present) whether a person will develop cystic fibrosis. Id.
at 78.
24. See Kolata, supra note 5, at 319. Several universities have already set up testing
centers for Huntington's disease and other disorders. See id. at 317-19. Because insurers may
begin to use genetic test results at any time, "Some people at risk for Huntington's disease
have already been advised to be well covered by insurance before they even enter a testing
program." Id. at 319.
25. A science publication projects that by 1992, over 30 million DNA probe tests will be
performed annually. Market for DNA Probe Tests for Genetic Diseases, GENETIC TECH.
NEWS, Nov. 1986, at 6-7 (noted in Medical Testing, supra note 20, at 132).
26. Lappe, supra note 4, at 5.
27. Id.
28. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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chusetts, already offers tests for cystic fibrosis and other disorders. 9
Collaborative's Chairman, Orrie Friedman, stated that the "big
money" will come from tests that determine predispositions to major
illnesses such as cancer and heart disease.30 Driven by the goal of
large profits, California Biotechnology of Mountain View, Califor-
nia, plans to introduce a genetic test for predisposition to atheroscle-
rosis by 1989.31
With millions of Americans affected by cancer, heart disease,
manic depression, and other disorders having genetic components,
the potential profits from genetic tests for such disorders are enor-
mous." This desire for profits, which has already fueled much of the
discovery of new genetic markers, promises to continue driving new
genetic discoveries in the foreseeable future.3
2. Gene-Mapping Project.-The United States government is
ready to embark upon a project to map the entire human genetic
component-the genome.34 The project will involve identifying the
three billion base pairs that make up the genome.35 Although the
estimated time for completion of the project is fifteen years,36 this
mapping project will lead to the discovery of many gene markers and
the precise location of many genes soon after the project com-
mences.3 One writer has noted that "[t]he number of inherited dis-
orders that can be diagnosed with linked genetic markers will grow
steadily as efforts to map the human genome gain momentum.
38
Current genetic testing technology provides information that
29. Joyce, supra note 12, at 47.
30. Id.
31. McAuliffe, supra note 2, at 66. Atherosclerosis, also known as hardening of the ar-
teries, is a condition marked by accumulations of cholesterol and other fatty deposits on the
inside walls of the arteries. It currently affects 6.7 million Americans. Id. at 65.
32. George Cahill, vice president of the non-profit Howard Hughes Medical Institute,
notes that "without profits over the horizon, [private] companies would not bother to map
genes ...." Joyce, supra note 12, at 47-50.
33. According to an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) survey of 83 biotechnology
companies, presently 43 are working on products that involve human DNA sequences, and six
other companies are planning to start in the near future. Approximately 20 companies are
developing genetic probes to be used to diagnose genetic diseases. See Joyce, supra note 12, at
46-47.
34. A genome is the set of chromosomes, genes, and hereditary factors derived from the
haploid number present in the reproductive cell before fertilization. "Haploid" refers to the
number of chromosomes present in reproductive cells before fertilization, half the usual num-
ber. SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, v-2, 37 (1988). See Genome Projects
Ready to Go, 240 SCIENCE 602-03 (1988).
35. See Genome Initiative, supra note 1, at 58.
36. Roberts, Watson May Head Genome Office, 240 SCIENCE 878 (1988).
37. Genome Initiative, supra note I, at 59.
38. Lewis, supra note 5, at 79.
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would be valuable to life and health insurers. As the technology im-
proves, more information will become available. Insurance compa-
nies will almost certainly begin to use this information unless pre-
vented from doing so by the government.
III. Insurers Will Want to Use Genetic Testing and Test Results to
Classify Applicants for Health and Life Insurance
American health and life insurance companies currently use
very little genetic testing to classify applicants for insurance. 9 As
one writer in the scientific community has noted, however, "Atti-
tudes toward genetic testing both for single gene defects and for dis-
ease predisposition may well change in the not-too-distant future."40
In a survey of major British health and life insurers by writers for a
science periodical, "The companies agreed that their underwriting
procedures would eventually take account of new diagnostic tests,
provided that they proved to be both accurate and reliable." 1 The
health insurance company which responded to the survey was ex-
tremely enthusiastic about genetic testing,42 and indicated that it
would use the results of such tests "to exclude benefit for any condi-
tion that was detected before the start of the policy." a4 3 Additionally,
evidence exists that American life insurance companies plan to use
genetic testing in the near future.4
39. According to an OTA report, "At present, a small proportion of ]insurance] appli-
cants are tested. In general these are individuals who indicate a history of disease or presence
of a risk factor (e.g., age, hypertension) on the application." Medical Testing, supra note 20,
at 141.
Classifications based on age, gender, health history, physical condition, and use of alcohol
and tobacco are widely utilized. Clifford & luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for
AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1808 (1987). Medical screening for life in-
surance currently is limited to "physicians' statements, blood profiles, blood sugar tests, chest
X-rays, resting and stress electrocardiograms, urine specimens, urine and saliva nicotine tests,
and paramedical and medical examinations." George, Life Underwriting Medical Require-
ments in the 1980's. . . and Beyond, 39 J. OF AM. Soc'y OF C.L.U. 80, 80 (1985) [hereinafter
Life Underwriting]. Several other tests have been proposed for use. See id. at 87-88. The Life
Underwriting article did not mention genetic testing. This is not surprising, however, because
in 1985, the year in which the article was published, the potential value of genetic testing was
not as well-defined as it is presently. See supra note 2.
40. Cooper & Barefoot, Can You Buy Insurance For Your Genes?, NEW SCIENTIST,
July 16, 1987, at 51 [hereinafter Insurance For Genes?].
41. Id. Seven of thirteen life insurance companies responded to the survey, as did the
one major health insurance company that was approached by the surveyors, Id. Four of the
seven life insurance companies which responded doubted that the tests would ever become
mandatory; three companies believed that mandatory testing would depend on a cost-benefit
analysis. Id.
42. Id. "The health insurance company gave an unreserved welcome to the developments
which will lead to preclinical diagnoses of hitherto undetectable [disease] states." Id.
43. Id.
44. According to Neil Holtzman, a geneticist at Johns Hopkins University who works
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Recognizing that the predictive value of genetic testing will be
great, 45 it is not surprising that health and life insurers will want to
use the results to classify applicants. According to representatives of
the insurance industry,"6 the primary goal of insurance underwriting
"is the accurate prediction of future mortality and morbidity
costs."'4 7 Since genetic tests can already determine either a person's
predisposition of contracting a disease,4 8 or even the certainty that
he will develop it,"9 and because "collectively [genetic disorders]
constitute a major source of morbidity and mortality, ' 50 insurers will
be interested in using results of such tests to classify applicants.5
IV. The Problems Associated with the Use of Genetic Testing and
Test Results by Health and Life Insurers
A. Denial of Health and Life Insurance - Economic Concerns
The use of genetic testing or genetic test results by insurance
companies could potentially restrict some from purchasing any
health or life insurance.52 At the very least, persons who carry a
for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, major insurers such as Equitable Life
Assurance Society have made substantial investments in developing genetic marker tests as
part of potential screening programs. Lappe, supra note 4, at 8.
45. "As researchers uncover more and more of the genes behind such 'multigene' disor-
ders [heart attacks, etc.], their ability to predict today who will die in 20 years time in-
creases." Joyce, supra note 12, at 45. "Gene tests, performed even before birth, will let people
know what health risks lie 10, 20, even 40 years ahead." McAuliffe, supra note 2, a 64.
46. Karen A. Clifford and Russel P. luculano co-authored an article on insurance classi-
fication as it relates to AIDS testing. See Clifford & luculano, supra note 39, at 1806. At the
time the article was published, Clifford was Assistant Counsel for the Health Insurance Asso-
ciation of American (HIAA), and luculano was senior Counsel for the American Council of
Life Insurance (ACLI). Id.
47. Id. at 1808. Clifford and luculano used an HIAA characterization of mortality as
"'the death rate at each age as determined from prior experience' [and] '[miorbidity' [as] the
'incidence and severity of sickness and accidents in a well-defined class or classes of persons.'"
Id. at 1808 n.9.
48. Determining predispositions is particularly relevant to diseases such as most forms of
cancer and heart disease, where there is nearly always both a genetic and an environmental
component. McAuliffe, supra note 2, at 65.
49. For diseases caused by a single gene when the gene is known, a direct gene probe
test can determine who has the gene and thus, who is most susceptible to the disease. This is
the case with sickle-cell anemia, for example. See supra note 13, 15-16 and accompanying
text. As the locations of more genes become known, more probes will be developed that can
determine with certainty whether a person will develop an inherited disorder. See Genome
Initiative, supra note 1, at 58-59.
50. Medical Testing, supra note 20, at 132.
51. "[I]t appears that the impact of genetic tests on the underwriting process will be felt
when genetic tests become part of routine [medical] care." Id. at 141. According to some
projections this will be as soon as 1992. See supra note 25. As noted earlier, however, classifi-
cation or rejection of applicants based upon genetic test results may begin at any time. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
52. See Kolata, supra note 5, at 319.
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gene for a particular disorder may be unable to obtain coverage for
that disorder.53 This creates very serious problems. Leroy Walters of
the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University has noted
the potential problems that could result from denial of health cover-
age because of a genetic trait:
To have insurance companies free to screen would seem to
me to sentence people who couldn't do anything about their
genes to facing potentially very large costs. The development of
these new diagnostic techniques may bring to a point questions
of what approach we as a society want to take to people born
with a genetic disease,54
Walters' comments raise concerns of economics and justice. Subpart
A addresses the economic problems associated with the use of ge-
netic tests to deny coverage to persons with genetic defects. Subpart
B addresses various considerations of fairness.
1. The Vital Importance of Health Insurance.-Medical care
costs in America have skyrocketed during the past two decades. 55
These escalating costs have caused Americans to rely increasingly
upon health insurance. Forty years ago, half of all hospital bills were
paid directly by patients. 56 By 1980, that figure declined to ten per-
cent.57 Because of these increasing costs and the increasing reliance
upon health insurance, denial of health insurance may be virtually
equivalent to a denial of health care. 58
In addition, private insurance is the means by which our nation
has chosen to carry out the function of paying for health care.5"
53. The British health insurance company that was surveyed by writers for a science
publication "declared its intention to exclude benefit for any condition that was detected before
the start of the policy." Insurance for Genes?, supra note 40, at 51.
54. Kolata, supra note 5, at 319.
55. In 1965, America spent $50 billion on health care; by 1985, this figure was $425
billion. Easterbrook, The Revolution in Medicine, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 40, 42. Addi-
tionally, at a typical large hospital the average patient's bill in 1987 was $3,345, compared
with $1,749 just five years earlier. Id. at 51. The cost of keeping a person in an intensive care
unit in 1987 was $50 per patient per hour just to cover labor costs. Id. at 71.
56. Mackay, The Regulation of Health Insurance, in REGULATING HEALTH CARE 81,
86 (A. Levin ed. 1980).
57. Id.
58. Leah Wortham notes that "access to [health] insurance may be tantamount to ac-
cess to health care, which in turn may be the difference between life and death." Wortham,
Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
349, 371 n. 12 (1986) [hereinafter Wortham, Actuaries]. This statement is accurate particu-
larly in an age such as the present when many hospitals are refusing admission to uninsured,
non-emergency cases because of the hospitals' decreasing ability to spread the costs of such
treatment to government and employer-insured patients. See Cahan & Pave, When the Patient
Can't Pay the Medical Bill, Bus. WK., Feb. 18, 1985, 59, 59-62.
59. Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 397. "The United States has rejected
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Thus, health insurance, while private in one sense, performs a vitally
important public service.6" These considerations must be afforded
considerable weight in the determination of whether genetic testing
by health insurers should be regulated.
2. The Role of Life Insurance.-Life insurance plays a less
significant role in our society than does health insurance. First, what
is being insured is less socially significant. Health insurance insures
maintenance of our lives when we are sick or injured. By compari-
son, life insurance insures a certain lifestyle for the family of an in-
come earner upon his or her death.6 Second, unlike health insur-
ance, no major public policy decisions62 have elevated the private life
insurance market to the level of performing a vital public function.
Third, while alternatives to life insurance, such as private savings
programs, may be much less secure or beneficial, a lack of health
insurance poses a more serious problem for families than such a lack
of life insurance alternatives.
B. Risk Distribution: Fairness Concerns
As the discussion in part V will indicate, the existing legal
framework of insurance classification tends to reflect the interests of
insurers. 3 In the area of state unfair discrimination laws, the insur-
ers' interests are reflected in the "fair discrimination" perspective."
schemes to guarantee universal health care or health insurance." Id.
60. One author quotes a California court which has described the insurance industry as
a "'purveyor[] of a vital service labeled quasi-public in nature' . . . which must place the
'public interest' above its own 'interest in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements.'" The
AIDS Insurance Crisis: What it Means for the Insurance Industry, 9 INS. LITIGATION REP.
282, 284 (1987) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter AIDS Crisis] (quoting Egan v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980)).
Another court has described insurance in the following manner: "A policy of insurance is
a voluntary contract, and may be made upon such terms and conditions as are agreed upon by
the parties thereto so long as they are not in conflict with public policy." L'Orange v. Medical
Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1968) (emphasis in original) (quoting John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 43 Ohio App. 242, 247, 183 N.E. 93, 95 (1931)).
61. See Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 399. "Those who wish to preserve a
middle-class life style for their families in the event of the breadwinner's death or disability
still need private life and disability insurance." Id. The importance of this function, the preser-
vation of one's standard of living, should not be disregarded. In relation to health insurance,
however, life insurance has a less socially significant role.
62. See supra notes 59-60 and sources cited therein.
63. See infra notes 108-49 and accompanying text.
64. The fair discrimination perspective holds that insurers should try "to measure as
accurately as practicable the burden shifted to the insurance fund by the policyholder and to
charge exactly for it, no more and no less. To do so is 'fair discrimination' . . . . Not to do so
is unfair discrimination." Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 361 (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83, 105). In
practice, this perspective permits insurers to use any classification which is reasonably related
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If one believes, however, that at least "[iln the broadest sense the
goal of any legal system is to achieve justice. .... -6" then the way in
which the fair discrimination perspective attempts to accomplish jus-
tice needs to be examined. This assessment will be analyzed in the
context of whether it would be just or fair to permit life and health
insurers to use genetic testing or genetic test results in order to de-
termine coverage and set rates.66
Kenneth Abraham6 provides an excellent framework for dis-
cussing fairness in risk distribution." He introduces four sets of con-
cerns regarding insurance classifications: (1) accuracy-equity con-
cerns, 6  (2) control-causality concerns,"0 (3) concerns about suspect
variables;7 and (4) risk redistributional policies.7 The latter three
concerns will be examined in the context of insurers' use of genetic
testing or genetic test results. The first, accuracy-equity, is omitted
because these concerns are already reflected in the law in the form of
the fair discrimination perspective.
1. Control-Causality Concerns.-The control-causality consid-
erations focus on variables over which the insured has little control
73
and are particularly significant when the variable is one over which
to a risk of loss. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
65. K. ABRAHAM. DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY. AND PUBLIC POLICY
at 18 (1986).
66. For the purpose of discussion, fairness in risk distribution, life and health insurance
will be treated together rather than separately. The fairness considerations do not vary signifi-
cantly for the two types of insurance.
67. Kenneth Abraham, a professor of law at the University of Virginia School of Law,
has written an excellent book about insurance classification. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65.
68. Abraham's framework for discussing insurance classification involves two additional
considerations, economic efficiency and equity between insurers and insureds. Abraham sug-
gests that insurance law as a whole should perform these three functions. K. ABRAHAM, supra
note 64, at 8-36. Abraham does not apply the three functions to particular classifications, but
rather to insurance classification law as a whole. It seems appropriate, however, to analyze
particular classifications utilizing Abraham's criteria, particularly the fair risk distribution as-
pect. The economic efficiency criterion will not be used here because they are already built into
the fair discrimination perspective, which is the status quo in the law. The equity prong will
not be addressed because it deals primarily with existing insurance policy relationships,
whereas genetic testing involves primarily pre-policy actions of insurers.
69. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 83. Accuracy-equity concerns are those that en-
courage classification to be made so that the cost of insurance reflects relative risks. Thus, low-
risk insureds will not be subsidizing high-risk insureds, and inaccuracy in measuring risks will
be equitably distributed. Id.
70. Id. Control-causality concerns are those which insist that classifying variables be
within the control of the insured, or be caused by the insured. Id.
71. Id. Suspect variables, such as race, are to be closely scrutinized even if they raise no
control-causality or accuracy-equity problems. Id.
72. Id. Redistributional policies are of concern because the choice of classifying vari-
ables will result in the redistribution of resources from one group to another. See id. at 95.
73. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 89.
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the insured has absolutely no control, such as his or her genetic
make-up. Abraham sets forth the argument against the use of non-
controllable classification variables as follows:
Noncontrollable variables can be criticized on the ground
that their use makes the exercise of individual responsibility ir-
relevant to the price one pays for insurance. No amount of care
or safety, no period of loss-free behavior can have any effect on
the cost of coverage when such variables distinguish risk classes.
Thus, use of noncontrollable variable denies individuals the op-
portunity, through the exercise of individual responsibility, to al-
ter the effect of being grouped." '
Whether specific variables are beyond one's control, and the extent
to which they are uncontrollable, will depend upon how one views
individual responsibility and control. 5 Genetic testing does not ignite
a serious debate on this issue of controllability, however, because
even libertarians 76 will admit that one's genes are beyond all con-
trol." Those with a more egalitarian position would be willing to
prohibit a variable such as genetic defects on the basis of non-con-
trollability alone.78 Thus, under either of these two divergent ap-
proaches, the insurers' use of genetic test results raises problems of
control.
Public perceptions of genetic testing by insurers reflect an egali-
tarian approach. In a 1985 Harris poll, seventy-five percent of per-
sons surveyed stated that they believed insurers would be unjustified
in using genetic test results as a basis for refusing to issue life or
health insurance to an individual.7 9 These perceptions, combined
74. Id.
75. See id. at 89-90.
76. Libertarianism is a theory of distributive justice that designates individual liberty as
its highest value. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 5. According to this theory, government
should not involve itself in distributing or redistributing value. Id. at 20. The liberatarian the-
ory opposes regulation on the grounds of individual autonomy and liberty rather than effi-
ciency. Id. Libertarians would be less likely to oppose government restricting insurers' use of
genetic defects because limits on the use of such uncontrollable variables do not restrict indi-
vidual liberty.
77. See id. at 90.
78. Both Abraham and Wortham discuss John Rawls' concept of the natural lottery of
endowments as it relates to insurance classification. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 26-29;
Wortham, Invisible Hand, supra note 10, at 884 (citing J. RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE at
11-17 (1971)). In Rawlsian analysis, those with genetic defects "should not be penalized in
insurance." Wortham, Invisible Hand, supra note 10, at 884.
79. The question asked by Louis Harris & Associates was, "Do you feel that insurance
companies would be justified or not in refusing to insure the lives of health of people who[se]
gene tests indicate [they] are likely to come down with a fatal disease later in life?" Business
Week/Harris Poll: It's O.K. to 'Play God'-Within Limits, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1985, at 85. In
response, 21 percent of those persons surveyed said insurers would be justified, 75 percent said
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with the uncontrollable nature of genes, suggest that a legal system
which permits insurers to use genetic test results would have serious
problems with social acceptability because of perceived unfairness.80
2. Suspect Variable Concerns.-A number of factors may
convert a classification variable into a suspect variable.8' Several of
these factors, especially the immutability of the characteristic and its
tendency to disadvantage rather than advantage groups of insureds,
are directly applicable to genetic test results. The use of genetic test
results has the potential for abuse by employers,82 as well as insur-
ers, making it a potentially suspect classification.
3. Risk Redistributional Policies.-Currently, if a person cov-
ered by health insurance is affected by a genetic disorder, the insur-
ance company pays for treatment of the disorder unless the policy
specifically excludes coverage for such an illness.8 3 Similarly, if a
person with life insurance dies due to a genetic disorder, the insur-
ance company will pay the benefits due under the policy.84 Thus, the
risks of genetic disorders are spread among all individuals who carry
health and life insurance.
If insurers are permitted to use genetic test results to determine
coverage and set rates, the entire risk of economic loss due to genetic
disorders will be shifted to individuals who are the unlucky carriers
of defective genes. The appropriate inquiry is whether this redistri-
bution is preferable to the present policy of sharing of the risk.
insurers would be unjustified, and four percent were unsure. Id.
80. "Social acceptability is another measure of perceived legitimacy and fairness." Wor-
tham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 412.
81. Abraham sets forth four reasons an insurance classification may be suspect: (1) a
variable, like gender, might be improperly utilized in fields other than insurance thus rendering
it symbolically objectionable; (2) the data used to predict loss may not be sufficiently probative
to justify their use when distinctions drawn may be socially objectionable; (3) the variable may
be used only to disadvantage groups, not to advantage groups; and (4) the variables may per-
petuate disadvantages among some groups who are already disadvantaged outside insurance
law. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 93.
Wortham identifies three indices of suspectness traditionally associated with equal protec-
tion analysis: (1) the immutability and ascriptiveness of the characteristic; (2) the history of
abuse of the characteristic; and (3) the irrelevance of the characteristic to legitimate uses.
Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 368 & n.95.
82. See Peirce, supra note 4, at 779-80; Lewis, supra note 5, at 81-82.
83. Since genetic test results generally are not used by insurers to classify insureds, there
is no reason for current policies to exclude benefit for genetic disorders. See supra notes 39-51
and accompanying text.
84. There would be no basis for the insurance company to exclude benefits for death
resulting from a genetic disorder unless the company utilized classifications based on genetic
traits. This type of classification is uncommon. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
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C. Ethical and Confidentiality Problems Associated With Genetic
Testing or the Use of Genetic Test Results By Insurers
Genetic testing by insurers raises several problems not associ-
ated with the use of other types of tests or classifications.
1. Ethical Problems.-Unlike tests for blood pressure or heart
strength, which may indicate poor general health or possible future
problems, genetic tests reveal the presence of specific genes and the
corresponding certainty that an individual will or will not develop a
disease.8 5 The psychological impact on persons who test positive for
an incurable disease could be devastating. Writers in the scientific
community have noted this potential problem.86 For example, one
writer has stated, "When a patient is told that he will almost cer-
tainly develop Huntington's disease, crisis and long-term counselling
must be provided. There is a risk of suicide, job loss, divorce, and
substance abuse for those persons so 'sentenced.' "I'
The relevant inquiry is whether society will permit insurers to
have the power to predicate health or life insurance on submission to
genetic tests, given the possibility that many individuals will experi-
ence grave psychological, social, and economic consequences as a re-
sult.8 The extreme seriousness of the consequences suggests that the
answer is "no."
2. Confidentiality Problems.-Perhaps equally as serious as
the ethical concerns are issues regarding the confidentiality of ge-
netic test results in the hands of insurers. Insurance companies ex-
change medical information about persons through the Medical In-
formation Bureau, a data bank containing information about
insurance applicants. 9 If genetic information is ultimately recorded
in these data banks-and there is no reason to believe it would not
be if insurance companies were permitted to test individuals or have
85. See supra notes 13, 49.
86. See New Frontiers, supra note 5, at 535-36; Insurance for Genes?, supra note 40, at
51.
87. New Frontiers, supra note 5, at 536.
88. In response to the question of who should have the power to demand the tests, "Most
geneticists agree that the decision should be that of the at-risk person alone." Id. at 535-36.
Two other scientific writers made the following observation: "We believe that any test for
susceptibility to disease should be done only in the interests of patients and their relatives.
Individuals should give their informed consent, with the confidentiality of tests results guaran-
teed. Testing should never be mandatory ...." Insurance for Genes?, supra note 40, at 51.
89. AIDS Crisis, supra note 60, at 284. These records are subject to subpoena, and thus
may be used for purposes other than insurance underwriting. Id. For a discussion of potential
abuse of data in the context of employment discrimination, see Schatz, The AIDS Insurance
Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1782, 1800-01 (1987).
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access to test results 9°-the consequences for an individual could be
devastating.
Because genetic data banks "will contain what may be per-
ceived as immutable 'facts' about a person . . . a genetic profile is
likely to be a permanent fixture of one's biological legacy."91 The
resulting stigmatization by society, and more importantly, by em-
ployers, could lead to even more psychological and economic hard-
ships. While a poor credit rating or a record of past drug abuse
which appears on a data bank can be cured or treated, "[A] 'posi-
tive' gene test, say, for manic depressive illness, provides an ineradi-
cable marker of deviance with potentially lifelong social conse-
quences to the affected individual." 92
These ethical and confidentiality issues associated with genetic
testing strongly support prohibiting insurers from utilizing these
tests. The psychological, social, and economic effects on individuals
who test "positive" for a disease appear to provide adequate justifi-
cation for prohibiting genetic testing and access to genetic test re-
sults by insurers.
D. Effects of Genetic Testing on Group Insurance in Employer-
Sponsored Plans
Approximately 85 percent of health insurance policies and ap-
proximately 45 percent of life insurance policies are issued to persons
through group plans.93 Most of these group plans are employer-spon-
sored. 94 Classifications are ordinarily not utilized in such plans95 be-
cause the basic premise of group insurance is that "in any large
group of individuals there will only be a few individuals who have
medical conditions of [significant] severity and frequency which
would, using individual underwriting standards, make them either a
substandard or noninsurable risk." 96 Three potential problems arise
when an insurer utilizes genetic testing in the group insurance con-
text: (1) genetic testing may result in employment discrimination
90. One scientist warns of the dangers of genetic data banks which he foresees being
created in the near future. See Lappe, supra note 4, at 7. Two other writers suggest that
"[t]he misuse of genetic information by, or obligatory disclosure to, third parties should be
made illegal if necessary." Insurance for Genes?, supra note 40, at 51.
91. Insurance for Genes?, supra note 40, at 51.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 10.
94. Wortham, Invisible Hand, supra note 10, at 849.
95. Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 398.
96. Clifford & luculano, supra note 39, at 1809 (quoting HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIA-
TION OF AMERICA. A COURSE IN GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE pt. A, at 153 (1985)).
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against insurance applicants of small group plans; (2) genetic defects
may be considered pre-existing conditions; and (3) genetic testing
may adversely affect large group insurance plans, as such testing un-
dermines the basic premise of large group insurance.
1. Employment Discrimination.-Individual screen-
ing-encompassing both medical tests and questions about health
history-is a prerequisite of small group coverage. 7 An employee
may be discriminated against should the employer learn, directly or
indirectly, that an employee tested "positive" for a disease.98 Persons
found to have genes for a devastating disease may have a very diffi-
cult time securing or maintaining employment. 99
2. Pre-Existing Conditions.-A second problem raised by ge-
netic testing in the group insurance context pertains to pre-existing
conditions. Group policies commonly restrict coverage for "pre-ex-
isting conditions" or conditions that existed prior to the beginning of
the policy.' It is unclear whether genetic defects would fall into
this category. If they do, insurers would have an even greater incen-
tive to use genetic tests in the group insurance setting. Further, this
might permit insurers to use test results that were made long after
coverage had begun to exclude benefits for disorders that were dis-
covered at a later time.
3. Effects of Genetic Testing on Large Group Plans.-Genetic
testing can potentially alter the manner in which group insurance is
underwritten. Group policies are based on the law of averages. 0 1 In-
surance companies, however, would benefit economically if they were
able to go beyond the law of averages and determine exactly which
persons in a group carried defectives genes, thereby decreasing the
insurer's overall risk. The question remains, however, whether other
societal values will prevent insurers from using such tests, both in
individual and group policies.
Even if insurers chose not to test large groups, insurers might
receive genetic information about group policyholders in other ways.
If the policyholder undergoes genetic testing as part of her employ-
97. See Schatz, supra note 89, at 1800.
98. For a discussion of this in the context of AIDS testing, see id. at 1800-01.
99. See Kolata, supra note 5, at 319 (comparing individuals with genetic defects to
epileptics who have experienced long-standing difficulties in getting jobs).
100. See Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 398 n.292.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
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ment 102 and the insurer pays for the tests, "it has the right to look at
the patient's medical records to learn the results of the test." ' In
fact, any tests that become part of a patient's medical records would
be subject to insurers' scrutiny. 10" Problems such as these are al-
ready occurring with the Huntington's disease test.10 5 According to
insurance companies, if the test results are in the patient's file the
insurers certainly will have access to the results.106 Therefore, the
economic, social, and other problems caused by genetic testing will
likely affect persons holding, and those applying for, group policies,
as well as those who rely upon individually purchased insurance.
This is particularly significant because over 136 million Americans
have employment-based, group health insurance.'
V. Insurance Classifications: The Existing Legal Framework
If health and life insurance companies began using genetic test-
ing or genetic test results today, their actions would, most likely, be
lawful. No state prohibits insurers from engaging in genetic testing.
Several states have laws that place limited prohibitions on the use of
genetic traits by insurers, but these laws provide no barrier to the
use of genetic test results for a wide range of genetic defects.' 0 All
states have laws prohibiting unfair discrimination in the issuing of
life insurance, 1 9 and most states have laws prohibiting unfair dis-
crimination in the issuing of health insurance policies." 0 As inter-
preted by the courts, however, these laws provide no barrier to the
use of genetic test results by insurance companies."' Additionally,
there is no federal law in this area.
A. The Absence of Federal Legislation
Historically in the United States, insurance has been regulated
by the states. In 1868 in Paul v. Virginia,"2 the United States Su-
102. According to a 1983 OTA survey of the 500 largest industrial companies, the 50
largest utilities, and the I I largest labor unions, over 20 percent of the 366 respondents said
they either used genetic testing currently or in the past, or considered using it in the future.
See Peirce, supra note 4, at 776.




107. Forgotten Patients, supra note 10, at 53.
108. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
112. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
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preme Court determined that the business of insurance was not com-
merce within the meaning of the Constitution's commerce clause.
Thus, the federal government was precluded from regulating the in-
surance industry. In 1944, the Supreme Court reversed the Paul de-
cision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associa-
tion. 3  The following year, however, Congress enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act," 4 which declared that insurance was to be
regulated by the states, unless the federal government takes specific
actions to regulate it."' Since 1945, there have been some congres-
sional efforts to regulate insurance classification,"" but thus far
these efforts have been unsuccessful.
B. State Laws Prohibiting Insurers from Using Genetic Traits for
Classification
No state has a comprehensive ban on the use of genetic test
results by insurance companies. Five states have laws that impose
some restrictions on the use of genetic traits in setting rates or deter-
mining coverage: California," 7 Florida," 8 Louisiana," 9 Maryland,' 20
and North Carolina.' 2 ' It is important, however, to recognize the
limited scope of these state laws. California, while banning the use of
any genetic trait by insurers, limits the ban to traits that will not
adversely affect the carrier. 22 Maryland also bans the use of all ge-
netic traits, unless the insurer has an actuarial basis on which to rest
its use of the trait.'2 3 The three other states ban the use of only one
or two specific traits."
24
113. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
115. See generally, Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life
Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 780-81 (1976) [hereinafter Regulatory
Challenge].
116. For a discussion of recently-proposed federal bills that would prohibit discrimina-
tion by insurers on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, see Wortham,
Actuaries, supra note 58, at 364-66.
117. CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West Supp. 1988).
118. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.9706, 626.9707 (West Supp. 1984).
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1 (West Supp. 1988).
120. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 223 (1986).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-195.5 (1982).
122. California prohibits life and disability insurers from considering any genetic traits
in determining rates or coverage, but only if the trait "causes no adverse effects on the car-
rier." CAL. INS. CODE § 10143(a) (West Supp. 1988).
123. Maryland prohibits life, health and disability insurers from considering any genetic
trait "unless there is actuarial justification for it." Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 223 (1986).
124. Florida and Louisiana prohibit life and disability insurers from considering the
presence of the sickle-cell trait in determining coverage and rates. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
626.9706, 626.9707 (West 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1 (West Supp. 1988). North
Carolina prohibits life insurers from considering the presence of the sickle-cell trait or the
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C. State Unfair Discrimination Laws
All fifty states have laws prohibiting unfair discrimination by
life insurers.12 Forty-one states have laws prohibiting unfair dis-
crimination by health insurers.""A Typically these statutes prohibit
unfair or deceptive practices. The Nebraska unfair discrimination
statute contains a representative definition of unfair or deceptive
practices:
hemoglobin C trait in determining coverage or rates. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-195.5 (1982).
125. ALA. CODE § 27-12-11 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.090 (1984); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (1975 & Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-66-206 (1987); CAL. INS.
CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104 (1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 38-149 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304 (1974 & Supp. 1986); FLA.
STAT ANN. § 626.9541 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-4 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. §
431-643 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 41-1313 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 848 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 507B.4 (West 1988); KAN, STAT. ANN. § 40-2404 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
304.12-080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1214 (West 1978); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 223 (1986); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 175, § 120 (1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2019 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
72A.20(8) (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-7-3 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.936
(1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1525 (1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 686A.100 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4 (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17B30-12 (West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-11 (1988); N.Y. INS. LAW §
42-4224 (Consol. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4 (1982 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §
26.1-04-03 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21 (Baldwin 1980); OKLA. STAT,
ANN. tit. 36, § 1204 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.015 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1171.5 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-29-4 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-
57-120 (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-33-12 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 56-8-104 (Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31A-23-302 (1986 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724 (1984 & Supp.
1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.480 (1984); W.
VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1988); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 628.34 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); Wyo.
STAT. § 26-13-109 (1983).
126. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (1975 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-
172 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304 (1974 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT ANN. §
626.9541 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-4 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-643 (1985);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 848 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4
(Burns 1986 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.4 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
2404 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:1214 (West 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159 (1974 & Supp.
1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 223 (1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 176D § 3 (1987); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS § 500.2029 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20(9) (West 1986); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 375.936 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1525 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
686A.100 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17130-12
(West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-11 (1988); N.Y. INS. LAW § 42-4224 (Consol. 1985);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4 (1982 & Supp. 1988); N.D, CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03 (Supp.
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21 (Baldwin 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1204
(West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.015 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5 (Pur-
don Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-29-4 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-200 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-33-13 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104
(Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-
23-302 (1986 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724 (1984 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-508 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.480 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4
(1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 628.34 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
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The following shall be unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the business of insurance: ....
(a) Making or permitting any unfair discrimination
between individuals of the same class and equal expec-
tation of life in the rates charged for any contract of lie
insurance or of life annuity or in any other of the
terms or conditions of such contract;
(b) Making or permitting any unfair discrimination
between individuals of the same class involving essen-
tially the same hazard in the amount of premium, pol-
icy fees, or rates charged for any policy or contract of
accident or health insurance or in the benefits payable
thereunder . . . .1 [emphasis added]
Whether the use of genetic test results would constitute "unfair dis-
crimination" depends upon the construction of the phrases "same
class and equal expectation of life" and "same class involving essen-
tially the same hazard."
1. Judicial Construction of "Same Class and Equal Expecta-
tion of Life".-On only one occasion has a court interpreted the
meaning of "unfair discrimination" in the context of life insurance.
In Hilson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada,128 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted Florida's non-discrimination
statute which contained language essentially identical to the Ne-
braska statute. " The court stated:
On its face the statute does not mean to prohibit a higher
charge when the insurer thinks the life expectancy of the insured
is lessened by some impairment of health. To increase the pre-
mium for taking the risk for such a cause is not a discrimina-
tion, but a reasonable difference.13
In that case the court held that real or anticipated differences in life
expectancy were all that was required in order to classify insureds
differently.
2. Judicial Construction of "Same Class Involving Essen-
tially the Same Hazard".-In Reeves v. New York Life Insurance
127. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1525 (1984).
128. 132 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1943).
129. Compare id. at 990 ("[llnsurants ... of the same class and equal expectation of
life .... ") with supra text accompanying note 127 ("[1Individuals of the same class and
equal expectation of life .... .
130. 132 F.2d at 990.
GENETIC INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION
Co.' 3' the Texas Court of Civil Appeals construed the term "unfair
discrimination" in the context of health insurance. The provision in
the Texas statute was almost identical to the Nebraska provision.' 82
In Reeves, the plaintiff could not show that any person "of the same
class and of essentially the same hazard" was charged a lower pre-
mium than the plaintiff. Therefore, the court held there was no un-
fair discrimination.133 The court concluded by quoting language
from Hilson: "To increase the premium for taking the risk for such a
cause is not discrimination, but a reasonable difference.'1
4
The significance of the decisions in Reeves and Hilson is that
health and life insurance companies may use any trait to differenti-
ate among insureds as long as there is a reasonable basis for con-
cluding that the trait places the insured at a greater hazard for ill-
ness or a lower life expectancy. 3 5 The presence of a gene or genetic
marker in a person can determine with up to 100 percent accuracy
whether a person will develop an incurable disease. 13 6 Therefore, use
of genetic test results would provide much more than the reasonable
basis required for differentiating among insureds. Consequently, the
use of genetic test results by life and health insurers would not be
precluded by the existing statutory framework, and judicial
interpretation.
D. The Existing Legal Framework Cannot Be Applied to the
Problem of Genetic Testing
Due to the paucity of case law interpreting state unfair discrim-
ination statutes, 3 7 one might query whether those laws could be ju-
dicially applied to prevent the use of genetic test results by insurers,
thus avoiding the need for major legislative efforts to change the ex-
131. 421 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
132. Compare id. at 688 ("[l]ndividuals of the same class and of essentially the same
hazard. ... ) with supra text accompanying note 127 ("[lndividuals of the same class in-
volving essentially the same hazard .... .
133. Reeves, 421 S.W.2d at 688.
134. Id. (quoting Hilson v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 132 F.2d 989, 990 (5th Cir. 1943)).
135. Commentators agree with this conclusion regarding the interpretation of state un-
fair discrimination statutes. See e.g., Wortham, Actuaries. supra note 58, at 370-93. "State
unfair discrimination statutes are interpreted to permit any rating classifier for which a statis-
tical difference between groups can be shown, while ignoring other issues." Id. at 370. This
perspective on state unfair discrimination laws is referred to as the "traditional fair discrimina-
tion perspective." Id. at 358-59, 361. For a discussion of the traditional fair discrimination
perspective, see supra note 64. See also Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 358, n.35.
136. See supra notes 13, 49 and accompanying text.
137. "State courts have touched only occasionally upon the objectives of unfair discrimi-
nation statutes and the principles that should guide classification regulation." Wortham, Actu-
aries supra note 58, at 387 (footnote omitted).
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isting legal framework. This may be possible, but for several reasons,
it is quite unlikely.
Arguments can be made that state unfair discrimination laws in
no way require insurers to use new classifications to differentiate
among insureds. One such argument has been developed by Leah
Wortham. a8 Wortham contends that unfair discrimination laws
were intended to limit insurance classification generally - not just
classification unsupported by statistical association with loss. Insur-
ance companies would then treat people equally." 9 Thus, it appears
possible to argue to state insurance commissioners'40 and courts that
other factors'" should be considered in deciding whether or not to
prohibit insurance companies from using genetic tests or test results
to classify insureds.
These arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, in-
ertia exists. Unfair discrimination statutes for life insurance have
been in force since the turn of the century. 4 During the late 1940s
and early 1950s, unfair discrimination laws for life, disability and
health insurance became widespread. 14 a Not only have these statutes
existed for a long period of time, but the judicial interpretations of
the statutes permitting any reasonably-based classification also have
been in existence for several decades. 4 Even in the absence of other
forces defending this body of law, its long history may keep it in
place for quite some time.
Second, powerful lobbying forces exist that seek to have unfair
discrimination statutes maintain their current meaning. The life and
health insurance industries vigorously defend the interpretation cur-
rently applied to unfair discrimination statutes.145 With this strong
138. See id. at 370-93.
139. See id. at 381-92.
140. Typically, insurance commissioners are statutorily assigned the duty of enforcing
insurance laws. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 38.
141. In the context of genetic testing, these factors include the problems caused by the
use of genetic testing or test results by insurers. For a discussion of these problems, see supra
notes 52-136 and accompanying text.
142. Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 384.
143. Id. at 383 n.179, 386.
144. Note that the Hilson and Reeves cases as of time of publication, were decided
forty-six and twenty-two years ago, respectively. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying
text.
145. Clifford and luculano, representing the Health Insurance Association of American
(HIAA) and American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) respectively, stated, "To underwrite
within the spirit of state antidiscrimination laws, an insurer is bound to accord similar treat-
ment in the underwriting process to those representing similar health risks." (footnote omit-
ted). Clifford & luculano, supra note 39, at 1811. The arguments made by health and life
insurers that persons suffering from AIDS should have to pay more for insurance, or be ex-
cluded from purchasing it at all, are premised on the currently accepted interpretation of state
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backing, current interpretation of state unfair discrimination laws is
likely to remain unchanged.
Third, the statutes that have specifically banned the use of ge-
netic traits for classification of insureds tend to reinforce the existing
interpretation of unfair discrimination statutes. Only two states have
enacted broad bans on the use of genetic traits by insur-
ers-California,"14 and Maryland. 14 7 In each case, however, the stat-
ute reflects the interests of insurers. The California statute prohibits
insurers from considering any genetic trait, but only if the trait will
not have adverse effects on the carrier.148 The Maryland statute per-
mits insurers to use any genetic trait as long as they can justify its
-use actuarially. 1 9
The existing legal framework is ill-equipped to deal with the use
of genetic tests and test results by insurers. It is also unlikely that
courts and insurance commissioners will adopt different interpreta-
tions of state unfair discrimination laws when forced to deal with the
problems genetic testing creates in the area of insurance. Therefore,
significant legislative change is required. A proposal for such change
and the reasons which justify it are presented below.
VI. Legislative Proposal: Genetic Testing and the Use of Genetic
Test Results By Health and Life Insurers Should Be
Prohibited
Both genetic testing and the use of genetic test results by life
and health insurers raise many problems. Individuals may be denied
much needed insurance. 150 There are also negative psychological, so-
cial and economic consequences that can result from genetic testing
or the use of genetic test results by insurers.' 5' These problems will
likely affect those in group insurance plans, as well as those with
individual policies. 52 Thus, most Americans will, in some way, be
adversely affected by an insurer's use of these procedures. Addition-
ally, the use of genetic testing and test results by insurers raises im-
portant questions concerning the fairness of using an uncontrollable
variable-genetic composition-to shift the economic burden of ge-
unfair discrimination statutes. See id. at 1810.
146. CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West Supp. 1988).
147. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 223 (1986).
148. CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West Supp. 1988). See supra note 120.
149. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 223 (1986). See supra note 121.
150. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
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netic disorders from the entire insured population to the unlucky per-
sons who have the defective genes. 153 Because of these serious
problems,1"4 both genetic testing and the use of genetic test results
by health and life insurers should be prohibited, subject to one lim-
ited exception, discussed below.
A. Use of Genetic Test Results by Insurers
While insurance is to a degree inherently discriminatory, 55 dis-
153. See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
154. Leah Wortham proposed that state insurance regulators be required to consider
seven factors in determining whether a particular insurance classification should be permitted.
These factors are as follows:
(A) the statistical power of the characteristic's prediction of loss;
(B) the degree of statistical separation of the grouping of insureds from the
remainder of the insured population which results from the use of the category;
(footnote omitted)
(C) whether the characteristic's relation to loss can be supported by a per-
suasive causal explanation;
(D) the degree of incentive created by the use of such characteristic in rat-
ing for reduction in number or cost of losses;
(E) the degree to which the classification is controllable by individual
insureds;
(F) the compatibility with widely held social values of the use of the charac-
teristic by which the grouping is defined; and
(G) the alternatives to private insurance coverage that are available to po-
tential insureds who cannot get this insurance.
Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 417-18. Wortham suggests that insurance regulators
should be required to weigh these factors and make written findings on each in the process of
determining whether the classification may be used by insurers. Id.
While a careful balancing of these criteria would be a useful approach for classifications
generally, their application to the use of genetic testing or genetic test results renders them
unsuitable for the type of balancing by insurance regulators which Wortham suggests. Assume
the classification is genetic test results for diseases caused by a known gene (or genes). In this
case the statistical and causation factors (A-C) will be supported to the greatest degree possi-
ble, in favor of insurers, because the presence of the gene will indicate that the person will
develop the disease. Factors D and E, similarly, will be supported to the greatest degree possi-
ble, in the insureds' favor, as there can be no prevention or control of loss by the insured.
Additionally, factor G will weigh heavily in the insureds' favor because there are no viable
alternatives to health insurance for individuals who are not eligible for Medicare or Medicaid
and few satisfactory alternatives to life insurance. With regard to factor F, it is not clear that
our society has developed any widely-held values with respect to the use of genetic traits in
grouping persons. For evidence indicating public opposition to the use of genetic test results by
insurers, see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
Thus, on the subject of genetic test results, there is a polarization of the various factors.
This is precisely the type of situation in which subjective balancing by an insurance commis-
sioner would be inappropriate. Rather, it is a subject upon which there should be legislative
decision-making so that the public, and not just insurance interests can have a significant ef-
fect upon the final policies.
155. "[Ilnsurance, to some extent, always involves discrimination, to a large degree
based on statistical differences and actuarial tables." Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 274 Or.
649, -, 549 P.2d 510, 512 (1976).
"'By its very nature, the sale of insurance is discriminatory.' The industry must be able to
differentiate or 'discriminate' between 'the good risks and the bad risks.' " Regulatory Chal-
lenge, supra note 113, at 779 (quoting Hacker, MINORITY REPORT, REPORT OF THE INSUR-
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crimination-or classification-based upon genetic test results
should not be permitted. While permitting insurers to use genetic
test results to classify insureds would enable insurers to cut down on
their total risk, it would cause many serious problems for a great
number of people. Since health and life insurers already insure for
genetic disorders,156 as long as they can be protected from problems
of moral hazard 157 they will not suffer economic losses from a ban on
the use of genetic test results.
Problems of moral hazard are created when insureds have more
information concerning their expected losses then insurers do.' 58 In
the context of genetic testing, there would be moral hazard for insur-
ers if a person was tested independently for genetic disorders, was
found to have genes that will cause a disease, and decided to
purchase large amounts of insurance based on the test results. In
these situations, especially when life insurance is involved, there is
potential for significant economic losses by insurers.
1. Life Insurance.-In order to avoid the problem of moral
hazard, life insurers should be permitted to ask questions to the ap-
plicant about any genetic testing he has undergone. Additionally, the
insurer should be given access to the results of tests which the in-
sured has undergone, subject to guarantees of confidentiality.' 5 9
Thus, insurers could only use the results of genetic tests to determine
rates or reject applicants if the applicant presented an extraordinary
risk based on problems of moral hazard.
2. Health Insurance.-Health insurers should not be afforded
this same opportunity to receive genetic information. Because of the
broad coverage of health insurance, there is significantly less risk
that moral hazard will cause economic losses for health insurers.
Health insurance covers far more than genetically-caused disorders.
Environmentally-related diseases, all types of injuries, and maternity
costs all provide adequate incentives for even the genetically
"healthy" to purchase health insurance. Thus, it is unlikely that
many persons will decide to purchase health insurance solely based
on the results of genetic tests. Health insurers do not need to use
genetic test results in order to prevent the relatively minor problems
ANCE TASK FORCE OF THE [IOWA] GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
Addendum (1975)).
156. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
157. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
158. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 65, at 35.
159. See infra text following note 176.
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caused by moral hazard.
Even if moral hazard presented more serious risks of loss by
health insurers, or the threat of higher rates for insureds was raised,
insurers would not be justified in using genetic test results. Both fair-
ness concerns1 60 and the vital importance of health insurance in our
society 6' demand that the economic burdens of genetic disorders not
be redistributed from the total insured population 62 to the unlucky
persons who have defective genes. The cost of genetic disease is cur-
rently spread among the total insured population.'6 3 By banning the
use of genetic test results by health insurers there would be neither
increased risk taken on by insurers, nor increased costs for health
insurance.""
B. Use of Genetic Testing
The reasons discussed above for prohibiting genetic testing by
insurers also support prohibiting the use of genetic test results. The
potentially devastating consequences of learning of one's genetic
make-up provide additional support for the ban. When a person is
genetically tested and found to have an incurable disorder, the conse-
quences for that person can be grave.165 When persons are told they
will develop an incurable disease, there is risk of suicide, drug abuse,
160. See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
.161. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
162. The number of persons covered by private health insurance exceeds 160 million.
See Forgotten Patients, supra note 10, at 53.
163. Since classifications based on genetic test results are generally not used by insurers,
the risk of insureds suffering from genetic disorders is spread among all those with the particu-
lar type of insurance, either health or life insurance. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying
text.
164. Leah Wortham suggests that a possible result of prohibiting insurers from using
genetic test results is higher insurance rates: "[1]f the cost of individual health ...policies
goes up because particular genetic traits, tendency toward diseases, or health histories cannot
be used as classifications, the healthiest in insurance pools may decide to forgo coverage. Cov-
erage likely would become more expensive." Wortham, Invisible Hand, supra note 10, at 888
(footnote omitted).
Upon close examination, it is apparent that both Wortham's reasoning and her conclu-
sions, particularly the conclusion that coverage will become more expensive, are erroneous.
First, because insurers today rarely use genetic traits to classify, but rather they insure for
genetic disorders, it is erroneous to assume that rates will automatically increase when such
classification by genetic testing is banned prior to being introduced or prior to gaining wide-
spread acceptance among insurers. Second, it is unlikely that many individuals will forego
health insurance even if they are determined to be "genetically healthy." This is because of the
wide range of illnesses-other than those related to genetics-that health insurance covers.
The assumptions that costs will increase both initially and in the future when healthy persons
drop coverage are, therefore, erroneous. Thus, the idea that rates will increase because of a
prohibition on insurers' use of genetic test results is unsupported by sound reasoning.
165. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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job loss, and other problems.166 Because of these destructive conse-
quences, it would be inappropriate for insurers to predicate the
purchase of insurance upon the applicant submitting to these genetic
tests.
Insurers may suggest that genetic tests should be permitted be-
cause they are no different than the many tests already routinely
performed prior to the issuance of life insurance policies. 11 7 This sug-
gestion would be incorrect. Direct gene probe tests' 68 will indicate
with certainty whether a person will develop diseases in the future."6 9
Tests currently performed by insurers indicate one of two things: (1)
the probability that a person may develop a condition in the future;
or (2) the actual existence of a condition, that is, a medical diagnosis
of a condition. 7 Clearly, a determination that one has an increased
risk of contracting a disease is not nearly as traumatic as a determi-
nation that one will definitely develop an incurable genetic disorder.
The diagnosis of an existing condition by an insurance physician is
no different than that diagnosis occurring in a routine visit to the
doctor's office. Therefore, current medical tests are very different
from the serious, personal decision of whether or not to learn one's
genetic make-up. This decision should be made only by the person
involved, not by insurance companies. 7
C. Proposal for National Legislation
The actions recommended above must be taken at the national
level. This will provide uniform standards across the country. More
importantly, it will avoid the many problems associated with insur-
ance regulation at the state level.17 2 The authority for national regu-
166. See New Frontiers, supra note 5, at 536. See also supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
167. For a list of such tests, see supra note 39. For a discussion of the tests, see George,
supra note 39, at 80-87.
168. See supra note 13.
169. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
170. See generally George, supra note 39 (discussion of current medical diagnostic tests
used by life insurers).
171. See supra note 88.
172. Wortham identifies several of these problems:
First, reform efforts in individual states frequently have been frustrated by
insurers' threats of withdrawal, or even actual withdrawal, from doing business
in the state. Second, it has proven difficult for state regulators to withstand the
political pressure that can be exerted by insurers. Third, because so much insur-
ance business is done across state lines, state regulators are often no match for
large national and international insurers. Fourth, to divert competitive efforts in
selection competition to more desirable forms of competition, all insurers must
be required to play according to the same rules.
Wortham, Actuaries, supra note 58, at 416 (footnotes omitted).
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lation of the insurance industry is the 1944 decision in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,173 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that insurance could be regulated by
Congress under the Constitution's commerce clause.
174
Pursuant to its commerce clause power, Congress should enact a
ban on genetic testing and the use of genetic test results by health
and life insurers as detailed above. The act should be structured sim-
ilar to the proposed bills banning discrimination based on race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin.'75 It should contain provisions
defining any genetic testing or the use of genetic test results by in-
surers, with the exception of limited use by life insurers, as unlawful
discriminatory actions. The national legislation should contain provi-
sions detailing the enforcement of the prohibitions, the jurisdiction,
and relief available. 76 A provision guaranteeing the confidentiality
of any genetic information that has been lawfully obtained by a life
insurer from the applicant should also be included. This can be ac-
complished by providing a civil cause of action for the insured if the
guarantee of confidentiality is violated. In addition to compensatory
damages, the act should provide for punitive damages in order to
deter insurers from sharing genetic test results with employers or
other insurers.
VII. Conclusion
The use of genetic tests and genetic test results by health and
life insurers presents serious problems in an area of the law that is,
at present, ill-equipped to deal with them. The use of such testing or
test results could leave many individuals and families without health
insurance and, therefore, without adequate health care. The confi-
dentiality problems associated with insurers' use of this information
also could lead to employment discrimination and social stigmatiza-
tion of individuals who tested positive for incurable diseases. In addi-
tion, genetic testing by insurers creates serious ethical problems, and
can cause severe psychological damage to those who are tested.
Genetic testing will be a part of our society's future. The ques-
173. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
174. See id.
175. See S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The United States House of Representa-
tives introduced a bill identical to the Senate bill. See H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
176. Senate Bill 372 provides for the following: (1) a civil action by or on behalf of the
aggrieved person; (2) a civil action by the U.S. Attorney General when an issue of general
public importance is involved; (3) jurisdiction for federal courts; and (4) judicial relief in the
form of an injunction against the insurer, amendment of the insurance contract involved, and
compensatory and punitive damages. S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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tion is whether we will permit insurers to use it in any way they
choose, or whether we will control the ways in which these important
tests and this sensitive information can be used. Ethics, economics,
and justice all support a ban on genetic testing and the use of test
results by health and life insurers. The time for legislative action is
now, before insurance discrimination based on the "luck of the ge-
netic draw" becomes widespread.
Joseph M. Miller

